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Abortion: Yid vs. Goy


    In a Sicha from 5722, the Rebbe posited the following question: why is it that only a non-Jew who commits abortion is chayiv misa while a Jew who does the same act is not?

    The following is a short synopsis of the Rebbe’s answer:

    The existence of a Yid is not a means to an end, to accomplish something within the world; rather, a Yid himself, his very being, is the עיקר and purpose of his existence. Everything else in this world, non-Jews included, their very existence is a טפל for the continued well-being of the Yidden.
    A fetus is a life with its potential and purpose yet to have been played out; its current status is טפל to its future self where it will live out its purpose. Based on this we can understand the difference in ruling between a Yid and a non-Jew in the case of abortion. A non-Jew—whose very existence is בגדר טפל— who has an abortion is chayiv misa because the fetus holds just as much of a qualified status as he does, a טפל. On the contrast Yid—being an עיקר— who would go through with an abortion would not be chayiv misa because we would not be מבטל an עיקר for a טפל.

    See full Sicha here: לקו"ש ח"ב עמוד 602

    The Halacha varies in context of levels of danger to the mother and stage of the pregnancy.

    Therefore, it is imperative to consult a Rov in all cases, whether is seems to be a case where one should be maikel or machmir.

    In the Public Eye


      In a letter dated 5729, the Rebbe reiterates his opinion against abortions in Eretz Yisroel.

      At a Farbrengen dated 5749 the Rebbe put forth the idea that when two sides of the government are in disagreement, unable to establish a coalition (as was the case at the time in Eretz Yisroel), there can be a common ground where they can meet. This could be done by starting with reinforcing previous laws that have been neglected, such as the law against abortion.

      The Halacha varies in context of levels of danger to the mother and stage of the pregnancy.

      Therefore, it is imperative to consult a Rov in all cases, whether is seems to be a case where one should be maikel or machmir.

      Early Sources on the View of Fetal Life


        The Gemara in Nida states that killing a child who is one day old is liable for his murder, implying that anything before this stage, i.e., a fetus, would not lead to such liability:

        נדה מד ע"א:

        תנוק בן יום אחד… וההורגו חייב

        A similar approach is taken in Maseches Erchin, Where the Mishna discusses the case of a pregnant woman who is being taken by the court to be executed.
The Mishnah rules that we do not wait for the woman to give birth before her execution. The Gemara asks, “פשיטא! A fetus is part of the body of the mother”, and there would be no reason to think that we should wait until the mother gives birth.

        ערכין ז ע"א

        מתני׳: האשה שיצאה ליהרג אין ממתינין לה עד שתלד האשה שישבה על המשבר ממתינין לה עד שתלד:
        גמ׳: פשיטא גופה היא איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הואיל וכתיב (שמות כא, כב) כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה ממונא דבעל הוא ולא ליפסדיה מיניה קמ"ל. ואימא ה"נ אמר רבי אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן אמר קרא (דברים כב, כב) ומתו גם שניהם לרבות את הוולד

        A further display of the lack of independent status of the fetus can be found in the Gemara’s continuation.
The Gemara rules that when the pregnant mother is taken out for execution the fetus is to be killed first because not doing so can lead to the disgrace of the mother as a result of publicly bleeding from the labor. Clearly implicit is the fact that we view the fetus as merely a limb in the mother’s body with no independent status:
        ישבה על המשבר וכו': מ"ט כיון דעקר גופא אחרינא הוא: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל האשה היוצאה ליהרג מכין אותה כנגד בית הריון כדי שימות הוולד תחילה כדי שלא תבא לידי ניוול.

        The Halacha varies in context of levels of danger to the mother and stage of the pregnancy.

        Therefore, it is imperative to consult a Rov in all cases, whether is seems to be a case where one should be maikel or machmir.

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